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3Executive Summary 
This report describes recent experiences with agricultural input trade fairs (ITFs) and vouchers in 
Mozambique. Since 2002, ITFs and vouchers have been the preferred mechanism for responding 
to emergency needs within the agricultural sector. After four years of ITF/voucher 
implementation and a sense of frustration with repeated emergency interventions in response to 
chronic problems, there is an on-going debate as to how best to modify the approach and what 
objectives ITFs should fulfill. 
Section 1 describes the current early warning systems in Mozambique and the ways in which 
emergency needs are assessed. The observation that the ITF/voucher approach is not fully 
integrated into these systems suggests that ITFs and vouchers have merely replaced the earlier 
‘seeds and tools treadmill’ that existed from 1998 up to 2002. An historical analysis of 
emergency seed interventions in Mozambique shows how the development of the formal seed 
sector has been closely linked with the provision of relief seed. There is pressure from some 
stakeholders for this link between formal seed sector development and emergency seed 
interventions to continue under the ITF approach, but whether this is the most appropriate option 
for the future is questioned. 
Section 2 of the report describes how the current ITF/voucher approach is implemented, the 
types of vendors who take part, and the inputs that are provided. Section 3 discusses the key 
issues arising from the ITF/voucher experience in Mozambique, where it is the very advantages 
claimed by the broader literature about seed fairs and vouchers that have proved to be the most 
controversial. The apparent ‘normalization’ of ITFs and vouchers in Mozambique allows for 
more developmental objectives to be realized through innovations in the way in which ITFs and 
vouchers are programmed, but there is a lack of consensus as to precisely what the objective of 
ITFs and vouchers ought to be. There has been a lot of pressure from the seed companies and 
agents to organize ITFs and vouchers in ways that favor the formal seed sector (e.g. by 
controlling prices, restricting the participation of non-local traders, and – most recently – new 
requirements for the registration of vendors). However, until the formal seed sector is better able 
to provide high-quality seed for a range of varieties that are well-adapted to locally specific 
conditions, farmers are likely to continue to be disappointed by formal sector seed. 
In terms of market development, it was widely felt that ITFs and vouchers encouraged 
commercial activity at a local level, despite the observation that the majority of the proceeds 
from ITFs do not necessarily remain in the local communities. However, the most successful 
ITFs (in terms of levels of participation and overall turn-over) are those that take place in areas 
where markets are already well-developed.  
ITFs provide a good opportunity to promote awareness about HIV/AIDS, but – somewhat 
surprisingly – no formal effort is currently made to promote agricultural extension messages at 
the fairs. As such the fairs are presently a missed opportunity for promoting accurate information 
about ‘improved’ agricultural technologies. There is also the opportunity to modify the 
ITF/voucher approach to provide a social protection mechanism for vulnerable farmers. In 
Mozambique, however, social protection is not yet on the agenda of MINAG, and agricultural 
staff are, in general, not familiar with the rationale or the approaches to social protection that are 
currently being promoted in other sectors or in other countries. 
4The report presents five different objectives that an ITF/voucher approach could potentially 
fulfill:  
(i) Emergency response to address lack of access to inputs: While there appears to be a 
move towards addressing alternative, more developmental objectives, it is also necessary 
to recognize and respond to a real emergency as and when this might occur. 
(ii) Social protection mechanism for vulnerable farmers: There is a need to recognize that 
some farmers are chronically vulnerable and may require long-term assistance to enable 
them to emerge from chronic poverty and food insecurity. Lessons from Malawi’s Starter 
Pack Programme can be useful is assessing whether ITFs and vouchers could provide an 
appropriate social protection mechanism for vulnerable farmers. 
(iii) Promotion of rural trade and agricultural marketing: Another option is for the current 
ITFs to evolve into ‘development fairs’ to promote rural trade in general and the 
marketing of agricultural products in particular. This implies that the fairs should not only 
provide an opportunity for farmers to purchase inputs, but also to sell their outputs, such 
as livestock and grain surpluses. 
(iv) Promotion of the formal seed sector: If the objective of the ITF/voucher approach is to 
promote the seed sector (whether formal or informal), it is essential that this is based on 
an accurate understanding of farmers’ seed preferences and requirements. The evidence 
available to date suggests that ITFs and vouchers offer limited opportunities for 
substantial increases in the sale of formal sector seed. At the same time, the formal seed 
sector appears to be incapable of supplying enough beans and groundnuts to meet the 
demand from farmers, and the germination rates of formal sector seed is often well below 
acceptable standards. 
(v) Promotion of crop and varietal diversity: There is considerable experience with fairs that 
aim to promote crop and varietal diversity, particularly in Latin America. Promoting 
agricultural diversity has the potential to strengthen local seed systems and increase 
resilience to drought and other disasters. 
The report makes the following recommendations:  
a) Strong leadership will be required to overcome the current lack of consensus surrounding 
the way forward for ITFs and vouchers and to ensure that the approach evolves to meet a 
clearly articulated objective. This report puts forward a number of options regarding 
possible objectives. Any decisions regarding the future direction of ITFs and vouchers in 
Mozambique must necessarily be based on credible and well-documented evidence. 
b) Regardless of which option is chosen, there is a need to undertake more consistent 
monitoring, evaluation and analysis to ensure that lessons are learned and shared across 
different parts of the country and that the approach is achieving the desired impact.  
c) In addition to regular monitoring, we recommend that a study should be undertaken to 
understand how farmers actually make use of the inputs acquired from ITFs, and what 
impacts the ITF/voucher approach has on agricultural production, markets, food security 
and vulnerability. 
d) Greater attention could be given to integrating the ITF/voucher approach within existing 
needs assessment, early warning, and decision-making structures such as the ICRISAT 
seed needs assessment methodology, DAP, GAPSAN and SETSAN. In the case of the 
ICRISAT methodology, some clarification may be necessary regarding the practical use 
of the local agricultural system profiles for needs assessment. 
5e) In organizing the ITFs, we recommend that as much information as possible is given to 
farmers concerning the inputs available, the prices, and how to use them (for those inputs 
which are unfamiliar). This will ensure greater transparency and choice to farmers.  
f) ITFs should be seen as an opportunity for promoting accurate information about 
‘improved’ agricultural technologies. We recommend that greater attention should be 
given to using ITFs to promote agricultural extension messages. 
g) In addition to seed quality, it is necessary that much greater attention is given to the local 
adaptability of seed provided through ITFs. 
h) In terms of seed quality testing, we recommend that – as well as distinguishing formal 
and informal sector seed - testing should distinguish informal sector seed which comes 
from grain markets from that which comes from local farmers’ fields, and that the results 
of seed quality tests should be made available to those concerned. 
i) More generally, we recommend that much greater effort should be placed on ensuring the 
quality standards of formal sector seed, both for seed which is provided through ITFs and 
other formal sector seed channels. 
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71. The changing context of emergency needs assessment 
and seed interventions in Mozambique 
1.1 Introduction 
Agricultural input trade fairs (ITFs) and vouchers have been implemented in Mozambique since 
2001, initially on a pilot level, and subsequently scaled up as the preferred mechanism for 
responding to agricultural emergencies at national level. Since 2001, a total of over 225 ITFs 
have taken place, providing almost US $ 950,000 worth of agricultural inputs through the use of 
vouchers distributed to over 100,000 farmers affected by drought.1
This report describes emergency seed interventions in Mozambique, specifically focusing on 
recent experiences with ITFs and vouchers. We examine the reasons for the shift from the direct 
distribution of emergency seed kits to ITFs and vouchers, and highlight the perceived advantages 
and disadvantages of the ITF/voucher approach. The report documents the lessons emerging 
from Mozambique’s experience with ITFs and vouchers, explores options for future 
development, and makes a number of recommendations. It is not intended as an evaluation or an 
impact assessment, for which more detailed quantitative data would be required. 
The insights presented in this report are based on informal semi-structured interviews carried out 
in six districts across Mozambique’s three southern provinces, together with the results of a 
quantitative survey covering 18 fairs in six provinces (Devji, 2004), and a review of relevant 
literature and documentation. The semi-structured interviews were conducted by the authors in 
late May / early June, 2005. Annex 1 lists those individuals who were interviewed. The survey 
was conducted by ICRISAT-Mozambique in February-April 2004 and focused on the types of 
vendors and seed being sold at the fairs. The survey covered a total of 105 vendors, and 118 seed 
samples were collected and tested by the National Seed Service. The results of the survey were 
supplemented by observation and informal conversations with those involved in the ITFs. 
1.2 Emergency needs assessment and early warning information systems 
in Mozambique 
Since the end of the war in 1992, floods and drought have been the main types of emergencies 
affecting Mozambique. Some of the largest rivers in southern Africa flow through the country 
(e.g. Limpopo, Incomati), and when the water levels rise there is an increased risk of flooding. 
Yet drought is also common, particularly across the sandy soils in the southern and central parts 
of the country where annual rainfall is less than 700mm and falls in a single rainy season 
(November to March). Given Mozambique’s vulnerability to natural disasters such as flood and 
drought, particular emphasis has been placed on developing the information systems necessary to 
predict such risks and provide a detailed analysis of vulnerability and food insecurity. 
Mozambique’s early warning system has been through a number of changes over the years, 
partly in response to changing information needs since the end of the war, but mainly due to the 
vagaries of donor funding. An Early Warning Department (DAP) exists within the National 
Agricultural Directorate (DINA) of the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG) to predict the size of 
harvests and provide advance warning of a disaster situation, particularly those with slow onset 
1 These figures are drawn from data provided by UCEA, ActionAid and SPA: see Table 1. 
8such as drought. DAP relies on information gathered by the District Agricultural Department 
(DDA) who supposedly use monthly crop production questionnaires to monitor the progress of 
the agricultural growing season. In practice, these data are not collected systematically: rather 
than relying on quantitative data, monitoring appears to be based on qualitative observations 
made by agricultural staff. When an emergency threatens, ad hoc data are collected through 
sector-based surveys that are implemented through various agencies, including the FAO-WFP 
Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission (CFSAM). 
The Early Warning Department is loosely affiliated with the Technical Secretariat for Food 
Security and Nutrition (SETSAN), specifically SETSAN’s Early Warning Working Group for 
Food Security and Nutrition (GAPSAN) 2. Annex 2 provides further details about SETSAN. 
SETSAN is increasingly focusing on problems relating more to chronic vulnerability and food 
insecurity rather than acute problems relating to so-called emergencies. Among many of the 
agencies working in Mozambique (particularly those in the agricultural sector) there is a strong 
sense of frustration with the repeated implementation of emergency interventions (particularly in 
response to drought) which are seen to have little impact on alleviating the problems that relate 
to more structural aspects of poverty, weak markets, and HIV/AIDS. In an effort to address these 
issues, SETSAN is developing action plans for small-scale projects and recommendations for 
policy change at the district level. 
At the district level, crop information collected by the DDA is also used to determine possible 
areas of need later in the season. This is complemented by informal reports made by extension 
workers and community leaders who keep the DDA constantly informed about the state of crops 
and their probable yield. Information from the DDA is reported to the Provincial Director of 
Agriculture (DPA) through the Provincial Agricultural Office (SPA). The progress of the rainy 
season is monitored very closely, and in 2005 the DPAs of drought-prone provinces were 
expected to make weekly reports to the Office of the President (José de Graça, personal 
communication). When drought conditions are apparent, the ad hoc District Emergency 
Committee comes together. This consists of representatives from various different government 
departments and NGOs working within the district. The District Emergency Committee 
determines which parts of the District are most affected by the disaster, establishes the criteria 
through which those households most affected by the disaster will be identified, and then helps to 
verify the beneficiary lists that are compiled by local leaders, village secretaries, administrative 
post heads, traditional chiefs, etc. Poorer households are generally deemed to be the most needy, 
and usually include female headed households and widows. The Committee determines the most 
appropriate interventions and organizes for these to be implemented. The way in which ITFs and 
vouchers are organized is described in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. 
At present, the planning of emergency interventions in the agricultural sector is not well 
integrated within the national system for early warning or the existing structures for designed to 
address vulnerability and food security, despite the fact that these systems are increasingly 
considering emergency interventions other than food aid. Also, there is no apparent linkage 
between the ITF/voucher approach and the seed needs assessment methodology developed by 
ICRISAT (ICRISAT 2002), for which local agricultural system profiles have been developed for 
disaster-prone districts. We therefore recommend that greater attention is given to integrating the 
ITF/voucher approach within existing needs assessment, early warning, and decision-making 
2 DAP staff are part of GAPSAN, but DAP information has yet to be fully incorporated into GAPSAN. There are 
plans to bring DAP within the new SETSAN structures at the provincial level. 
9structures such as the ICRISAT seed needs assessment methodology, DAP, GAPSAN and 
SETSAN. In the case of the ICRISAT methodology, some clarification regarding the practical 
use of the local agricultural system profiles may be necessary. 
1.3 Early emergency seed interventions and the formal seed sector in 
Mozambique
Assistance to farmers by means of seeds and tools distribution was officially started in 1988 with 
the creation of the Emergency Programme for Seeds and Tools (PESU – Programa de 
Emergencia para Sementes e Utencilios) using funds from the Mozambique-Nordic Program 
(MONAP)3. The objective of this programme was to assist small-scale farmers affected by 
drought and civil war. Technical assistance to PESU was provided through the Finnish 
agricultural agency, Finagro. Seeds were imported from neighboring countries (mainly from 
Seed Co, Zimbabwe) due to the low capacity of seed production of the National Seed Company 
(ENS – Empresa Nacional de Sementes), the official seed production company of Mozambique, 
and distributed to farming areas in bulk. Displaced families returning to liberated areas were 
provided with seeds and tools to help them to re-establish their agricultural activities. Each year, 
an estimated average of 1.2 million families received assistance from this program (Howard et al 
2001).
At the same time (1988), the Nordic countries also supported the development of the seed sector. 
The Swedish government, through the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) 
(Agencia Sueca para o Desenvolvimento Internacional, ASDI) contracted the Swedish seed 
company, Svalof-Weilbul, to assist in the creation of SEMOC (Sementes de Mocambique lda)
within the existing National Seed Company (Helder Gemo, personal communication). Following 
the model of Svalof- Weilbul, SEMOC was established as the sole formal sector seed company 
responsible for the production of all seed required in the country. The Danish government, 
through DANIDA, contracted the Danish Seed Testing Station to assist in the development of the 
National Seed Service (SNS – Servico Nacional de Sementes) as the organization mandated to 
control seed quality. Further details on the formal seed sector are provided in Annex 3.  
Other funds to assist drought- and war-affected farmers with seeds and tools were provided by 
international NGOs (World Vision, CARE, Action Aid, World Relief etc.), both independently 
and through PESU. For greater transparency and administrative convenience, the NGOs 
proposed to organize seed distribution through the use of pre-prepared kits containing seeds and 
tools. The seed kit approach was adopted by PESU and the seed companies prepared the pre-
defined kits for different zones. The kits contained seeds of maize, cowpea, groundnuts, beans 
and vegetables, together with various tools. SEMOC, under Svalof management, grew rapidly to 
take the leadership of this business, and almost all of SEMOC’s sales - about 90% - was sold to 
the emergency programs (Howard et al. 2001). Most of SEMOC’s seed was imported from 
neighboring countries, with some local production. SEMOC’s annual seed sales steadily 
increased up to about 14,000 tons in 1993 and then steadily decreased to about 3,000 tons in 
1997 when PESU phased out (Britt Granqvist, personal communication). These figures vividly 
illustrate the degree to which the establishment and evolution of SEMOC was dependent on the 
emergency response programs. After 1996-7, the Nordic assistance to SEMOC and SNS phased 
3 Other supporters of PESU were the African Development Bank (7 million US$ in 1995) and JAICA (Japan 
International Cooperation Agency) with 2 million US$. 
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out, and SEMOC was bought by Seed-Co. (Zimbabwe)4. SEMOC continued preparing 
emergency seed kits through tendered contracts with NGOs and FAO until the introduction of 
ITFs and vouchers in 2001. 
1.4 The transition from seed kits to agricultural input trade fairs and 
vouchers
In February 2000, devastating floods affected large areas of the Limpopo and Zambezi valleys. 
Once immediate humanitarian needs had been met, attention soon turned to the need for seeds to 
allow farmers to re-plant their farms once the waters had receded. The widely publicized funding 
appeal for seeds and tools prompted the publication of an open letter from concerned 
stakeholders – including those who had been involved in the earlier seed distributions described 
above – to relief and humanitarian agencies, warning against the delivery of seed of 
inappropriate crops and varieties (ICRISAT 2002). The letter was essentially a plea to avoid the 
many mistakes of the earlier emergency seed distributions. Yet the same seed kit approach was 
used in response to the floods, under the leadership of FAO’s Emergency Division (TCOR). An 
Input Distribution Unit (IDU) was created inside the FAO delegation in Maputo composed of 
expatriate FAO staff and local DINA staff from the Ministry of Agriculture to provide technical 
assistance to the seed distribution programs that were implemented largely by NGOs.5 Because 
of the high demand, seed had to be procured from multiple sources at short notice and inevitably 
some of the seeds were of low quality (especially maize and cowpea) and were not appropriate to 
local growing conditions (World Bank 2003). 
By 2001, after 12 years of seed kits distribution, those involved in emergency seed provisioning 
were ready to try a new approach. There was a widely shared sense of frustration over the fact 
that the delivery of seed kits to farmers was always late, and that the types of seeds being 
distributed were not necessarily appropriate for all parts of the country. ActionAid had been 
involved in direct seed distribution, but realized that it was not sustainable on a long term basis, 
and became suspicious when farmers started asking for seeds and tools on a regular basis. 
Although no formal post-distribution survey was carried out, ActionAid staff suspected that 
farmers were not actually planting the seeds provided through the seed kits, and started to search 
for alternative interventions. The ActionAid country manager had heard about the use of seed 
fairs elsewhere and sought further information as to how a similar approach might be 
implemented in response to drought in northern Mozambique. At that time, the main source of 
information in Mozambique concerning the use of seed fairs and vouchers in emergencies was 
ICRISAT’s newly-established office in Maputo. 
Following the floods of 2000, USAID provided funding to ICRISAT for a 2-year project titled 
‘Linking relief seed distribution to trade and market development’ (2001-03). This project aimed 
to develop and promote a comprehensive plan for emergency seed interventions that would not 
undermine commercial and local-level seed systems. One of the four components of this project 
was to test and develop a seed fair/voucher approach that would provide farmers with a greater 
4 In 1998 51% of SEMOC shares were bought by Seed-Co of Zimbabwe and the Mozambican government lost the 
primacy of the company (World Bank 2003). 
5 IDU’s tasks were subsequently taken over by the Emergency Coordination Unit for Agriculture (UCEA) which 
was established in 2003-04 and managed by the DINA staff previously employed by IDU, with some assistance 
from FAO.  
11
choice of seed, and also support farmer and commercial seed systems.6 The development of ITFs 
and vouchers in Mozambique followed the CRS model (Remington et al 2002). The head of the 
Emergency Coordination Unit for Agriculture (UCEA) was invited to Kenya to observe CRS 
seed fairs, together with an ICRISAT employee. They learnt about fairs from first-hand 
experience in Kenya, and also from CRS reports about seed fairs and vouchers in other countries. 
This experience allowed them to draft guidance notes for the implementation of what was 
subsequently to become known as input trade fairs (ITFs) and vouchers in Mozambique. 
In 2001, FAO was motivated to implement the ITF/voucher approach and supported the first 
pilot seed fairs in the districts of Maringue (Sofala province) and Macossa (Manica province) 
using Italian Cooperation funds. The donor stipulated that the fairs should be implemented by an 
NGO, and the contract was awarded to Kulima, an agency working with a network of local 
NGOs. Training was provided by ICRISAT to DDA and Kulima staff who then selected the 
beneficiaries and informed farmers and local traders. Local NGOs working with Kulima then 
distributed the vouchers and implemented the fairs. The approach was seen to be successful, and 
was subsequently replicated by IDU/UCEA staff in Maputo Province using funds from 
PROAGRI. After these experiences, the Ministry of Agriculture – through DINA - recognized 
the ITF/voucher system as the preferred mechanism for assisting farmers affected by disaster in 
Mozambique. This public endorsement by the Ministry, combined with the level of frustration 
with the earlier seed kits, prompted a rapid change from seed kits to ITFs and vouchers. At 
present, all emergency seed interventions use the ITF/voucher approach. The only direct seed 
distribution that goes on presently is not for emergency needs but for development purposes in 
promoting specific crops or varieties. 
At the same time, ActionAid’s first pilot ITF/voucher intervention was implemented in Maganja 
da Costa (Zambezia). The ActionAid staff tasked with implementing this reported that it was 
initially very difficult to convince their fellow ActionAid staff that it would work. Logistics, 
administrative and financial staff were particularly resistant, largely due to concerns about 
possible corruption (Eduardo Costa, personal communication). To prevent misuse, the vouchers 
were printed in South Africa at great expense, and it was later realized that this was not 
necessary.
The main perceived advantages of ITFs and vouchers in this early period were that seed could be 
provided on time and farmers could choose the crops and varieties that were appropriate to their 
needs, thus addressing the two major problems that had been associated with the direct 
distribution of seed kits. In terms of development, the fairs were initially recognised as a way of 
promoting local seed trade and production, though it is only now (some four years later) that 
mechanisms for linking ITFs and vouchers to local seed production groups are beginning to be 
explored in practice7.
6 The other three components were to develop a methodology for assessing seed needs, the establishment of a seed 
supply database, and follow-up on specific policy recommendations. 
7 CRS guidelines warn against linking emergency seed fairs with support to community seed multiplication or seed 
banks that are not based on agro-enterprise analysis (Bramel et al 2004: 166). 
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2. Agricultural input trade fairs (ITFs) and vouchers, 2001-
2005
2.1 Scale of implementation of ITFs 
Table 1 shows the number and size of ITFs that have been organized in Mozambique since 2001. 
The ITF/voucher approach was implemented on a pilot scale in 2001 and 2002, and then 
subsequently scaled up quite considerably. The pilot fairs implemented in the first year have 
been described above. In 2002 and 2003, NGOs implemented ITFs and vouchers, under the 
supervision of the DDAs. A lack of capacity (in terms of trained staff and equipment) meant that 
it would have been difficult for DDA to implement for themselves on a broader scale. However, 
the implementation through NGOs proved to be very expensive, and often they relied on DDA 
for assistance. With decentralization, DDA capacity was increased so that they were able to 
implement themselves on a broad scale in 2004. 
Table 1. Input Trade Fairs implemented in Mozambique (December, 2001-March, 2005) 
Year Donor Implementing agencies Season* No. of 
fairs




COSV Kulima and local NGOs First 6 31,595 2475 
DEC Action Aid First 2 12,766 1000 
PROAGRI DDA First 2 7468 900 
2001
Total 10 51,829 4,375 
PROAGRI DDA First 31 57,000 7050 2002
Total  31 57,000 7,050 
COSV ActionAid, Kulima, IPM, 
ADCR, LWF, Caritas, 
Muchefa
Second 17 51,609 7660 
DFID ActionAid, Kulima, CCM, 
Caritas, APROS 
Second 9 40,021 4950 
DFID CARE, Mahlahle, Vet-Aid, 
Handicap Intl, Kulima, 
Muchefa, ATAP, ADCR, 
Caritas, IPM, Pro-Lide, 
Aceagrarios, ASA, CCM 
First 67 265,353 20820 
Swedish Aid ADCR, Caritas, CCM First 8 32,340 4000 
2003
Total 101 389,323 37,420 
DFID ASA, Kulima, Aceagrarios, 
CCM, ADEM, ADS, DDA, 
Umokazi
Second 28 112,382 13,900 
Swedish Aid CARE, ATAP, Malhalhe, 
Vet-Aid, Kulima, Machefa, 
Caritas, ADCR, Pro-Lide, 
ActionAid
Second 22 88,936 12,000 
South Africa DDA First 37 129,829 15,900 
Provincial funds DDA First 9 34,468 5400 
2004
Total 96 365,615 47,200 
2005 South Africa DDA Second 22 82,468 10,200 
* First season fairs are held between August and December for the main cropping season. 
Second season fairs are held between February and March for vegetable seeds and other inputs. 
Source: Compiled from data provided by UCEA, ActionAid, and SPA.
(US$1 = 23,500Mt) 
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2.2 Needs assessment and targeting of beneficiaries 
If an emergency intervention is considered necessary by the DPA, then the DDA and/or the ad
hoc District Emergency Committee will prepare a contingency plan that includes a certain 
number of ITFs, based on the number of people affected. The recommendation concerning ITFs 
is conveyed through the Provincial Agricultural Service to UCEA (often as early as May or 
June), who will then respond once the level of funding available for emergency agricultural 
interventions is known (by about July or August). As soon as it is known that there will be 
funding available for ITFs and vouchers, a Fair Preparation Group is formed at District level. In 
some cases, the Fair Preparation Group might be formed before the ad hoc District Emergency 
Committee is formed, and the Fair Preparation Group more or less merges into the District 
Emergency Committee. This level of advance planning suggests that ITFs and vouchers have 
become the ‘normal’ response to so-called emergency situations. 
The actual number of ITFs that are organized depends mainly on the level of funding allocated. 
Once UCEA has informed the DPA how many people can be supported at provincial level, then 
the DPA will use the available figures to determine how many people can be supported in each 
district. In 2004-5, some provinces (e.g. Manica, Maputo) organized ITFs with funding that was 
allocated from the provincial agricultural budget,8 in addition to the ITFs that were funded from 
national funds allocated through UCEA. This allocation of provincial funds indicates the value 
accorded to the ITFs and the degree of local government ownership that has been achieved. Once 
the number of people to be supported in each district is known, the DDA will decide roughly 
where these will be located, and for each fair an Organizing Committee is assembled. The 
Organizing Committee holds meetings in each of the beneficiary communities to verify the 
beneficiary lists, agree on a precise location for the fair, and determine what kinds of inputs are 
likely to be required by the beneficiaries. 
The way in which the beneficiary lists are drawn up and verified varies slightly between 
provinces and districts and depends on the planning time available before implementation. 
Ideally, a draft list of ‘affected people’ is compiled by community leaders, and this is then 
verified in public meetings involving DDA staff and anyone from the community who wishes to 
attend. Each name from the list is called out and members of the public will ‘vote’ as to whether 
or not the person should be included, according to whether or not they are considered to be 
deserving and ensuring that only one member from each household is included. The total number 
of people on the beneficiary list depends on the level of funding available for the fairs9. Given 
that each fair might include four to six communities, the same number of meetings will be held 
over the course of several days. Each meeting takes about half a day and involves up to about 
150 people, depending on the size of the community. The precise location of the fair will also be 
agreed at these meetings, which generally take place about a month prior to the fair itself. If there 
is insufficient time for these public verification meetings to be held, then the beneficiary lists will 
be verified by DDA staff and members of the Organizing Committee, but this less transparent 
8 In the 2004 main season in Manica Province, four additional fairs were held using funding from an FAO food 
security project and the provincial PROAGRI budget. In Maputo Province, 5 additional fairs were organized, 
providing for a total of 3,000 beneficiaries and costing 450 million Mts (90 m Mts per fair) with funding from 
PROAGRI money allocated to the Province. 
9 Under the FAO project, the amount of 90 m Mts. is allocated per fair. Once the number of seed fairs has been 
decided for the district, then the total amount of funding for the district as a whole will be known and it is up to the 
DDA staff to decide on the relative size of each, provided that the overall budget is within the total amount 
allocated.
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process has reportedly resulted in problems when it comes to the distribution of the vouchers. 
ActionAid has developed a methodology for the selection of beneficiaries, but guidelines have 
yet to be completed. 
2.3 The logistics of an input trade fair 
The Fair Preparation Group and the Organizing Committees are responsible for ensuring that 
people are informed about the forthcoming ITF. Information is spread through informal channels 
of communication to farmers (both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries), local traders, and others. 
In some areas, the members of the Organizing Committee will travel around the local area a few 
days prior to the each fair to ensure that people know. Provincial agricultural staff are 
responsible for informing the seed companies and seed company agents; this is usually done by 
letter, and then the DDA staff follow up by telephone and other means to confirm that 
arrangements and ensure that the agents are aware about the types of inputs that will likely be 
required.
In the case of the ITFs coordinated by FAO and UCEA, funding is transferred to the DDA bank 
account in advance and the vouchers are delivered from Maputo to the DDA office. The day 
before the fair, the DDA staff organize the vouchers according to the allocations per community. 
The fair site is prepared the day before by members of the Organizing Committee who set up an 
enclosure with a single entrance. 
On the day of the fair, speeches are made to welcome everyone and explain what will happen 
(Fig 1). In some cases, each of the input vendors (there are rarely more than 12 vendors per fair) 
is given the opportunity to publicly inform the beneficiaries about their products (Fig 2). 
However, in Zavala District we were informed that the seed companies felt that they were 
disadvantaged by these announcements because the price of their seed was inevitably higher than 
the price of the seed (or grain) provided by local farmers and traders. For this reason, the seed 
companies insisted on not announcing seed prices, so the practice was discontinued. However, 
for greater transparency and choice to farmers, we recommend that as much information as 
possible is given to farmers concerning the inputs available, the prices, and (for those which are 
unfamiliar) how to use them. 
Figure 1. Explaining about the seed fair 
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Figure 2. Vendors promoting their products at the beginning of the seed fair 
Figure 3. Distributing vouchers before the seed fair start 
Each beneficiary is given a booklet of vouchers worth a total of 190,000 Mts. Although initially 
the vouchers were given for free, the current system involves a contribution of 20,000 Mts by 
each beneficiary. The DDA staff undertaking the voucher distribution note the serial number of 
each booklet against the name of the beneficiary (Fig 3). While the vouchers are being 
distributed, the vendors are allowed into the enclosure to set up their stalls or arrange their 
products. Each vendor and his or her wares are registered and checked for quality and 
appropriateness by members of the Organizing Committee (Fig 4). The items brought for sale are 
listed and weighed and the prices noted. At the end of the day the amount of each product sold is 
also noted. This is the main type of monitoring information that is collected and allows the 
organizers to check what has been sold (Annex 4). 
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Figure 4. Vendor registering the products for sale.
Figure 5. Helping the farmers to use 
     the vouchers 
Figure 6. Music and dancing at the end of the fair 
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Once the vendors have set up their products, beneficiaries are then allowed into the enclosure 
with their vouchers. DDA staff are on hand to answer questions and advise the beneficiaries on 
how best to spend their vouchers according to their needs (Fig 5), and to ensure that the prices of 
the products sold is according to the agreed prices. Some of the staff said that it was difficult to 
control what goes on in the fair and that there are a number of bad practices taking place, as 
detailed in sections 2.6 and 2.7. In general, however, each fair has a festive atmosphere: it is a 
sociable and lively event, with participants meeting old friends and making new acquaintances; 
local traders selling soft drinks and snacks; and often a theatre company to provide entertainment 
and awareness about HIV/AIDS (Fig 6). 
At the end of the day, the vendors redeem their vouchers for cash from the DDA staff (Fig 7), 
who must check the serial number of each voucher. DDA staff interviewed in the course of this 
study agreed that the task of checking the serial number and making the payments was a 
laborious and difficult procedure, not least because they are expected to make up any financial 
shortfalls from their own pockets. Security has not been a problem to date at any of the ITFs in 
Mozambique, though policemen are on hand in case of any disturbances. The money for the ITF 
is transported by the DDA staff from the local bank to the fair location on the day of the fair. 
There were no reports of any known corruption from those interviewed, who agreed that the 
limited amount of time for the exchange of vouchers prevents their misuse. Although there were 
no known cases of vouchers being exchanged for cash, it is theoretically possible that 
beneficiaries might use their vouchers to purchase tools which can then be later sold for cash. 
Figure 7. Redeeming vouchers at the end of the 
fair
2.4 Vouchers, cash and the types of inputs sold through trade fairs 
This value of each voucher booklet (190,000 Mts. or about US $ 8) was originally determined 
according to the value of the previous seed kits. However, this was subsequently found to be too 
high in some areas, and led to a ‘lottery syndrome’ in which farmers’ normal seed selection 
mechanisms and purchasing judgments were abandoned by the need to spend a large sum of 
money in a short amount of time (Dominguez et al 2004). In 2003, this problem was solved by 
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the introduction of a beneficiary contribution of 20,000 Mts in order to receive the voucher 
booklet. Although the value of the voucher booklet has remained at 190,000 Mts, the amount that 
is actually transferred to beneficiaries is now 170,000 Mts (about US $ 7). 
Each booklet is made up of 18 vouchers worth 10,000 Mts, and ten vouchers worth 1,000 Mts, 
though DDA staff and vendors all agree that the 1,000 Mts voucher is unnecessary and merely 
makes the payment process more laborious. Each booklet has a serial number and the same serial 
number is printed on each voucher and its counterfoil within the booklet (Fig 8). In theory, these 
serial numbers allow for the purchases made by selected beneficiaries to be traced, but such data 
are not recorded in practice. We recommend that a study should be undertaken to understand 
how farmers actually make use of the inputs acquired from ITFs, and what impacts the 
ITF/voucher approach has on agricultural production, markets, food security and vulnerability. 
Figure 8. Vouchers of different denominations and the voucher booklet used in 2004 
Although the initial fairs provided only seed, it was quickly realized that various different types 
of agricultural inputs could also be sold through the fair, hence the name ‘input trade fairs’ (ITF). 
Vouchers are exchanged for various different types of seed (see section 2.6), vegetative planting 
materials, tools, fertilizer, pesticides, and even water pumps and livestock in some cases. Table 2 
provides information about the quantities of seed and tool inputs sold in relation to the quantities 
brought by the traders. The quantities sold depend on the number of farmers and their purchasing 
power in relation to the number of traders, the appropriateness and quantity of the inputs. The 
data in Table 2 suggest that there is no guarantee that a trader will be able to sell the inputs that 
they bring to the fair. 
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One of the advantages of the ITFs is that they allow farmers to purchase inputs that they might 
not normally use. Since most agricultural inputs are highly seasonal, those inputs that have least 
demand tend not to be stocked by traders on a regular basis, e.g. actellic (a powder used to treat 
seed and grain to prevent insect damage in storage). Without vouchers, farmers generally 
couldn’t afford to purchase actellic and consequently traders tended not to stock it. With ITFs 
and vouchers, however, farmers have the means to purchase it and traders are now stocking it 
specifically for the fairs. Another advantage of the fairs that is often cited in the literature is that 
the funds transferred for the sale of inputs remain in the local community. This is discussed 
further in section 3.3. 
The fairs also attract an array of traders selling items other than agricultural inputs, and often a 
parallel market is formed around the outside of the fair enclosure, where products such as food 
grains, sugar, oil, snacks and soft drinks can be purchased in exchange for cash (Fig 9). Any 
trader who is refused entry to the fair enclosure (generally because their ‘seed’ is considered by 
the Organizing Committee to be sub-standard) is allowed to sell on a cash basis outside the 
enclosure. As such, the fairs promote trading activities in rural areas. Even within the fair 
enclosure, vendors are allowed to sell for cash as well as vouchers. In some fairs, the value of 
cash sales is slightly more than voucher sales, as shown by Table 3. 
Table 2. Amount of inputs brought and amount sold at selected ITFs in Chokwe District 
  Amount brought  
(kg or pieces) 
Amount sold 
(kg or pieces) 
Seed (kg) 4413.88 2540.81 (58%) Hokwe ITF 
(500 Beneficiaries) Tools (pieces) 1171 281 (24%) 
Seed (kg.) 10,936.43 2284.85 (21%) Chiguidela ITF 
(400 beneficiaries) Tools (pieces) 1357 300 (22%) 
Source: DDADR-Chokwe
Table 3. Cash sales at selected ITFs in Chokwe District 
 Voucher sales  
(US $) 



















Figure 9. Other products and goods for sale outside the seed fair enclosure 
2.5 Numbers and types of vendors taking part in input trade fairs 
Although the number of beneficiaries attending each fair is fairly constant – between 400 and 
600 beneficiaries – the number of vendors varies according to how well the ITF has been 
publicized, the location, and the attitudes of the traders who are invited to participate. DDA staff 
reported that it was initially difficult to attract traders to come to the ITFs, but after they realized 
that the vouchers would potentially increase their sales, they came with a range of different 
products. The number of vendors differs for different parts of the country: as shown by Table 4, 
the number of vendors participating in ITFs in central zone remains small because markets in 
this part of the country are generally less well-developed than in the south. In terms of the gender 
of the vendors, there tend to be more female vendors in the southern zone (Devji 2004). 
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Table 4. Number of vendors taking part in ITFs 
 Total vendors Vendors by gender 





Central Zone    
Tete 3 8 6 0 6 
Manica 4 8 6 0 6 
Sofala 3 5 4 0 4 
Southern Zone    
Inhambane 5 9 7 2 5 
Gaza 10 11 10 6 4 
Maputo 4 6 5 4 1 
TOTAL 3 11 6 2 4 
Source: Devji 2004 
Figure 10. Seed fair vendors
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Data collected by Devji (2004) distinguish three types of vendors (Fig 10): (i) local traders are 
those traders or farmers who live in the area of the fairs; (ii) non-local traders are traders who are 
resident in districts or provinces other than that of the fair; and (iii) seed company agents who are 
licensed to sell formal sector seed (see Annex 3 for further information about seed company 
agents). The majority of vendors coming to the fairs tends to be non-local traders (Table 5), 
although the general consensus among the DDA staff interviewed was that local traders have a 
better knowledge of the types of inputs that farmers require and the types of seeds and varieties 
that are most appropriate to the local area. For this reason, farmers generally prefer to buy from 
traders who they already know. Non-local traders often travel long distances to participate in the 
fairs; traders from Xai-Xai market in Gaza, for example, participate in fairs in Inhambane, Gaza 
and Maputo. The problem with traders coming from outside the local area is that the seed types 
that they bring may not necessarily be well-adapted to the local area. This is further explored in 
section 3.2. There is only a small number of registered seed company agents in each province, 
and some agents refused to participate in some of the fairs in Gaza and Maputo due to arguments 
over price (see section 2.7). In the fairs funded through Provincial funds in Manica and Maputo 
Provinces, only formal seed company traders were allowed to participate due to complaints (by 
the company agents) about the quality of seed being sold by unlicensed traders (Dumba-Nengue),
especially those coming from Xai-Xai (Luciano 2005). 
Table 5. Types of vendors participating in ITFs





Central Zone 12 (34%) 14 (40%) 9 (26%) 35
Tete 1 (10%) 5 (50%) 4 (40%) 10
Manica 7 (41%) 7 (41%) 3 (18%) 17
Sofala 4 (51%) 2 (25%) 2 (25%) 8
Southern Zone 18 (29%) 32 (52%) 12 (19%) 62
Inhambane 1 (5%) 12 (60%) 7 (35%) 20
Gaza 6 (22%) 17 (63%) 4 (15%) 27
Maputo 11 (73%) 3 (20%) 1 (7%) 15
TOTAL 30 (30%) 46 (47%) 21 (22%) 97
Source: Devji 2004. 
2.6 Seed types and seed quality 
The types of crops sold in the fairs varies according to the season: in the first or the main 
cropping season (August-January), maize, beans and groundnuts are commonly grown, so these 
crops predominate in the first season fairs; and in second season (February-June) vegetables are 
more important. In terms of the types of seed, we distinguish between formal sector seed (also 
known as certified seed10) and informal sector seed (also known as local seed11). Types of 
informal sector seed can also be further classified according to whether the seed is sourced from 
grain markets or from farmers’ own production. Formal sector seed is subject to the quality 
controls imposed by existing seed legislation and is more expensive that informal sector seed. 
Annex 3 describes the formal and informal seed sectors in more detail. 
10 However, much of the seed that is sold as formal sector seed at fairs lacks the lot numbers, which are one of the 
defining characteristics of certified seed (see footnote 14). 
11 However, much of the informal sector seed brought to fairs by traders originates from outside the local area. 
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The types of crops produced by the formal and informal seed sectors varies. Due to the difficulty 
of producing vegetable seed through the informal sector, most of the vegetable seed planted by 
farmers in Mozambique (and sold at ITFs) is formal sector seed that has been imported by the 
seed companies from overseas. Maize, beans, groundnut, and rice, on the other hand, can be 
either from the formal or informal seed sector. Other crops such as millet, bambaranut, 
pigeonpea, and sesame are not produced by the formal seed sector in Mozambique. Other types 
of planting material, such as tree seedlings, banana suckers, sweet potato vines and cassava 
cuttings, all come from the informal seed sector, though are rarely seen at ITFs in Mozambique. 
Similarly, in Western Uganda, bananas, sweet potatoes and cassava were completely absent from 
seed fairs because these crops tend to be sold in situ rather than in markets (van der Steeg et al 
2004).
Figure 11. Informal and formal sector seed being sold at seed fair 
Different types of traders tend to sell different types of seed – local and non-local traders tend to 
sell informal sector seed, and company agents tend to sell formal sector seed (Fig 11) – but, as 
illustrated by Table 6, these distinctions are by no means exclusive. Some traders also sell formal 
sector seed, and some agents also sell informal sector seed. Data collected from ITFs in Tete, for 
example, revealed that the formal seed sector was unable to supply sufficient quantities of bean 
seed to meet the level of demand, so seed company agents were instead selling informal sector 
bean seed that had been purchased from farmers in Angonia and packed in bags specifically for 
the ITFs. The fact that this informal sector seed had been packaged and was selling for the same 
price as formal sector seed led farmers to believe that it was formal sector seed, when in fact it 
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had been sourced from the informal sector (Devji 2004). Similar cases have been reported at 
ITFs held in Marracuene, where bean seed sold by Panaar and SEMOC was found to be mixed 
and have low germination rates (Luciano 2004). Such practices are further discussed in section 
3.2.
The fairs also attract an array of traders selling items other than agricultural inputs, and often a 
parallel market is formed around the outside of the fair enclosure, where products such as food 
grains, sugar, oil, snacks and soft drinks can be purchased in exchange for cash (Fig 9). Any 
trader who is refused entry to the fair enclosure (generally because their ‘seed’ is considered by 
the Organizing Committee to be sub-standard) is allowed to sell on a cash basis outside the 
enclosure. As such, the fairs promote trading activities in rural areas. Even within the fair 
enclosure, vendors are allowed to sell for cash as well as vouchers. In some fairs, the value of 
cash sales is slightly more than voucher sales, as shown by Table 3. 
Table 6. Types of seed sold by vendors
Type of Vendor  Type of seed sold Frequency  
Informal sector seed only 26 (87%) 
Formal sector seed only 2 (7%) 
Local traders 
(n=30)
Informal and formal sector seed 2 (7%) 
Informal sector seed only 35 (76%) 
Formal sector seed only 1 (2%) 
Non-local traders
(n=46)
Informal and formal sector seed 10 (22%) 
Formal sector seed only 13 (62%) Company agents 
(n=21) Informal and formal sector seed 8 (39%) 
Note: Based on the assumption that the same seed vendors are selling seed at different seed fairs, seed samples were collected 
from one fair only. For this reason, it is not possible to draw comparisons between different seed fairs 
It is the role of the National Seed Service (SNS) to ensure that formal sector seed is produced 
and sold according to the quality standards set by national seed laws. Since 2004, SNS staff have 
been collecting ITF seed samples to be tested for purity and germination, but we were unable to 
acquire any of these test results from the SNS staff interviewed. Table 7 shows the seed quality 
results for the quality tests commissioned by ICRISAT as part of the study conducted by Devji 
(2004). The table attempts to distinguish formal and informal sector seed12. Although the small 
sample sizes for some of the crops make it impossible to draw any firm conclusions from these 
data, a number of inferences can be made. 
All seed types have low germination percentages except Mocuba maize, Bonus beans, local 
millet, and local bambaranut. Although the germination of formal sector seed tends to be slightly 
higher than informal sector seed, many of the formal sector samples fail to meet the quality 
standards set by law13. Out of all the formal sector seed samples collected, only two had a lot 
number14, suggesting some degree of doubt about the types of seed that seed companies are 
selling. The lowest germination rates were for PAN67 maize, local groundnut, beans and maize. 
Test results for local groundnut, beans and maize, however, vary greatly, with a minimum 
12 The table in fact uses the varietal names recorded to distinguish improved varieties from ‘local’ varieties. 
However, unless the actual source of the seed is recorded it is very difficult to distinguish formal and informal sector 
seed. The assumed distinctions between formal and informal sector seed presented in Table 7 should therefore be 
regarded with caution. 
13 Minimum germination rates are as follows: maize-90%; groundnut-80%; beans-85%; cowpea-80%; chickpea-
80%.
14 The lot number is like an identity tag for seed. It is a number that is given by SNS to identify the seed and its 
precise origin. 
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germination rate as low as 9% and maximum as high as 92%. It is unfortunate that the tests 
performed on informal sector seed did not distinguish seed sourced from grain markets and seed 
from local farmers’ production. It is widely thought that seed from grain markets is of much 
lower quality than seed from local farmers (which can sometimes be of much higher quality than 
formal sector seed), but there is no data available to confirm this observation. Low germination 
rates stem from late harvest and poor storage; although this is not a problem for grain that is 
intended for consumption, farmers take particular care in ensuring a timely harvest and good 
storage for seed that is intended for planting. We recommend that – as well as distinguishing 
formal and informal sector seed - testing should distinguish informal sector seed which comes 
from grain markets from that which comes from local farmers’ fields, and that test results should 
be made available to those concerned. 
Other data collected by SNS and published by ABIODES are presented in Table 8 and show 
similar results as those in Table 7, though the germination rates for formal sector bean seed are 
extremely low (4-5%). In terms of physical composition, test results were very good (98-100% 
purity), regardless of the type of vendor or product, suggesting that physical selection is 
undertaken for all seed types. 
One of the problems with testing seed at the time of the fairs is that the test results are not known 
until after the fair. This is an ineffective way of controlling the quality of seed brought to the 
fairs. To rectify this situation, SNS is now moving towards testing seed prior to the fairs. The 
problem with this, however, is in ensuring that the seed lots tested are the same as those brought 
to the fairs. 
Table 7. Germination rates of seed sold at ITFs 
Seed type Germination rate (%) 
 Minimum Maximum Average 
Formal sector seed Maize - Matuba (n=11) 53 90 83 
Maize - Sussuma (n=3) 74 91 84 
Maize - Mocuba (n=1) 75 75 75 
Maize - Pan67 (n=5) 11 77 43 
Groundnut - Natal common (n=3) 54 82 65 
Common beans - Bonus (n=2) 77 93 85 
Common beans - Pan 159 (n=1) 47 47 47 
Sunflower - Pan7351 (n=1) 90 90 90 
Sorghum - Macia (n=1)  88 88 88 
    
Informal sector seed Maize -local (n=22) 14 91 62 
Groundnut - local (n=19) 9 88 49 
Common beans - local (n=30) 9 92 64 
Cowpea - local (n=9) 59 89 76 
Cowpea -B.mix (n=4) 57 78 64 
Bambaranut - local (n=1) 80 80 80 
Sorghum - local (n=2) 71 87 79 
Sunflower - B. record (n=1) 71 71 71 
Sunflower - local (n=1) 74 74 74 
Data from only 97 vendors out of the 105 interviewed: the remaining 8 vendors were selling only tools, not seed 
Source: Devji 2004 
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Table 8. Seed quality results for ITFs in Maputo province (2003)
Seed Vendor Crop Variety Purity (%) Germination 
Company Common beans Bonus 100.0 5 
Company Common beans Bonus 99.3 4 
Company Sorghum  99.9 86 
Local vendor Maize SC513 100.0 77 
Local vendor Common beans Bonus 99.3 80 
Local vendor Groundnut Mixtures 98.6 54 
 Groundnut Local 97.9 70 
Local vendor Groundnut Local 99.1 78 
Local vendor Groundnut Local 99.5 87 
Local vendor Maize Local 98.7 81 
Local vendor Maize Local 99.9 76 
 Maize Local 99.8 79 
 maize Local 100.0 84 
Local vendor Maize Local 99.2 84 
Local vendor Common beans  100 74 
Local vendor Common beans  99.3 86 
Local vendor Green bean  97.3 93 
Local vendor Cowpea Local 97.5 73 
Source: Alberto & Massinga, 2004: 13 (from SNS test results, 2003). The data have been re-arranged according
to the vendor and variety type of seed indicated 
2.7 Seed prices 
In most developing countries in Africa, the price of formal sector seed is normally between two 
and five times higher than informal sector seed. In Mozambique, the price of formal sector seed 
is about five times the cost of informal sector grain. For example, the price of maize grain sold in 
Xai-Xai or Maputo grain markets is approximately 4,000 to 5,000 Mts per kilo, whereas the price 
of formal sector maize seed purchased through retail shops is normally 25,000 Mts15.
At recent ITFs the price difference between formal and informal sector seed is not nearly so great 
due to pressure put on local and non-local traders by seed company agents to increase the price 
of informal sector seed. The price data collected at the ITFs shows that the price difference 
ranged from 2.5 times down to zero (Table 9). Although difficult to substantiate, we heard many 
reports of artificial price distortions taking place at the ITFs. All of those interviewed who had 
been involved in implementation reported incidents of cheating by the seed companies and 
traders. DDA staff are aware of various types of bad practice, but they say that it is difficult to 
control what goes on in a fair. The way in which seed companies were said to prefer not to have 
the prices and promotional information announced in public, as mentioned in section 2.3, is one 
example. In another case, it was reported that the seed company representatives threatened the 
traders by saying that if they did not increase their prices (to be closer to the price of the certified 
seed) they would have them sent to prison. This was confirmed by traders interviewed in Xai-Xai 
market, who admitted that this price increase was bad for the farmers, but said they were forced 
to raise their prices if they wanted to take part in the fairs. In Marracuene District, it was reported 
that the price of seed sold by the seed company agents increased once they knew that 
15 SEMOC has two price systems: seed sold in small quantities at retail shops is slightly more expensive than the 
cost of seed purchased in bulk by farmer associations, NGOs and other development projects. Seed destined for ITFs 
is purchased by the retailers at the lower price but marked up at the ITF to account for transport costs. 
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beneficiaries had to use the vouchers in the same day and there was no competition (Luciano 
2005). There are also unsubstantiated reports of seed company agents increasing their prices as 
soon as the traders’ seed has all been purchased. Various different suggestions have been put 
forward for controlling this situation, as described in section 3.2. 
Table 9. Price of seed at ITFs 
Central Zone Southern Zone 
Seed type Tete Manica Sofala Inhambane Gaza Maputo 
Maize - local 40000 35000 35000 15000 10000 15000 
Maize - Matuba 40000 40000 35000 25000 25000 25000 
Common bean - local 40000 35000 35000 35000 35000 27500 
Common bean - Bónus 40000 - - 35000 35000 40000 
Cowpea -local 40000 35000 35000 30000 35000 25000 
Cowpea -B. mix 40000 - - 30000 - - 
Groundnut - local 40000 35000 40000 30000 35000 30000 
Groundnut - Natal Common 40000 40000 - 40000 - 35000 
Source: Devji 2004 
Table 9 presents the prices of various different seed types for the ITFs in different provinces and 
reveals considerable price variation between provinces. In general, prices in the southern zone 
are lower than those in the central zone. This relates to the fact that there are more vendors 
participating in the ITFs in the southern zone (as reported in section 2.5) and thus greater levels 
of competition. The price variation between different crops also varies according to the quantity 
available. In the Tete fairs all seed has almost the same price, probably because both the number 
of vendors and quantities of seed were low. The price difference between formal and informal 
sector seed is discussed further below. This price difference is a major factor determining the 
quantities of seed bought by beneficiaries, hence there is considerable pressure by seed company 
agents to increase the price of informal sector seed. The data recorded for Gaza, for example, 
show a very low local maize seed price because the NGO implementing the fairs had fixed the 
price for maize to avoid competition because it was considered to be very low quality. 
2.8 Monitoring and evaluation 
At every fair, monitoring is undertaken by DDA staff who record the details of each vendor, the 
quantities of each item that they bring to the fair, the prices at which they are sold, and the 
quantities that are left unsold at the end of the fair (as shown in Annex 4). These data have been 
entered into an Excel database and form the basis of FAO’s reports to donors. By measuring the 
quantity of items left unsold at the end of the fair, and knowing the total value of the vouchers, 
the amount of goods sold for vouchers and cash respectively can be determined. To date, there 
has been no formal follow up with beneficiaries to determine what happens to the inputs 
acquired at the fairs, though in some cases farmers will informally mention to DDA staff how 
they have used the inputs, or invite DDA staff to visit their farms. No formal cost analysis has 
yet been undertaken. 
In 2001, an evaluation was undertaken that sought to determine whether farmer seed vendors 
became seed producers as a result of their participation in the fairs (Cuna, personal 
communication). However, since most of the more recent fairs tend to attract the same traders, 
this type of evaluation is no longer appropriate because it merely produces the same results for 
each fair. No subsequent evaluation focusing specifically on ITFs and vouchers has since been 
carried out, though brief mention is made of the approach in the DFID-funded evaluation 
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commissioned by MADER and SETSAN of the broader drought mitigation activities 
implemented in 2004 (Austral Consultoria e Projectos, Lda 2005). This report recommends that 
there should be increased monitoring of the end use of inputs purchased at ITFs. 
2.9 Implementing agencies and capacity building 
Over the four years that the ITF/voucher approach has been implemented in Mozambique, a very 
impressive level of human capacity has been developed among all of those involved: NGOs, 
Ministry of Agriculture, traders, seed companies and agents, and farmers. Those coordinating 
and implementing the fairs have developed the expertise necessary not only to respond 
efficiently to emergency situations but also the capacity to transform the ITF/voucher approach 
to fill various other, more developmental functions that will be explored in section 3. 
Table 1 lists some 20 NGOs that have been involved in the implementation of ITFs and 
vouchers, not including the various local NGOs who work in association with Kulima. Since 
2004, the DDAs of some 7 districts in 52 provinces throughout the country have also 
implemented ITFs. The capacity to implement ITF/voucher interventions was initially developed 
through formal training courses facilitated from 2001 to 2003 by UCEA and ICRISAT (Fig 12). 
More recently, DDA staff have gained capacity more informally, often through on the job 
experience. In some cases, DDA staff have been taken to visit ITFs implemented in neighbouring 
districts to allow for learning opportunities. Guidance notes drafted by ICRISAT (based on the 
CRS approach) and used as a training tool for those implementing ITFs and vouchers in 2001 
were subsequently revised in the light of the lessons learned from the early pilot activities and 
published in Portuguese by ICRISAT and DINA in 2002 (Fig 13), and also made available 
electronically in English. A first edition of 500 copies was printed, and in 2003 a second edition 
of another 500 copies was printed and distributed among those implementing the fairs. Although 
still considered to be relevant, ICRISAT is considering updating the guidelines to reflect recent 
changes.
After scaling up the implementation of ITFs and vouchers, the 2004 shift in implementing 
agencies from NGO to DDA was made possible by the decentralization process through which 
additional capacity was provided to the DDAs. Prior to 2004, the DDAs had been involved in 
supervising the fairs implemented by NGOs, and some limited implementation in areas where 
NGOs lacked sufficient capacity. Through supervising the ITFs, the DDA staff realized that they 
could implement for themselves, and it is considerably cheaper to implement ITFs and vouchers 
through the DDA than through NGOs. Another advantage of implementing through the DDAs is 
that they cover all parts of the country, whereas NGOs are not necessarily present in all areas. 
NGOs, on the other hand, have a more integrated approach and – unlike the DDAs - do not focus 
exclusively on agriculture. The more agricultural focus of the DDAs may limit the potential for 
developing the ITF/voucher approach beyond strictly agricultural activities unless other actors 
become involved. 
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Figure 12. Training session by ICRISAT staff
Figure 13: ICRISAT-INIA guidelines for seed 
fairs
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Mozambique’s experience with ITFs and vouchers has allowed for capacity to be developed in 
neighbouring countries and other sectors. Ministry and NGO staff from Zimbabwe were invited 
to observe the ITFs taking place in Mozambique. In the case of ActionAid, one of the staff 
involved in the ITF/voucher approach in Mozambique conducted training courses for ActionAid 
staff in Malawi and Zimbabwe. More generally, presentations based on the Mozambique 
experience have been made by ICRISAT staff in relevant workshops and international 
conferences held Angola, Entebbe and Rome. Within Mozambique, the ITF/voucher approach 
has been adapted to the education sector; SC-UK have held educational fairs to allow the 
children of families affected by HIV/AIDS to access school text books and stationery (Lori Bell, 
personal communication). 
3. Key issues arising from the Mozambique experience and 
options for the future 
In Mozambique, it is some of the very advantages of the ITF/voucher approach claimed by the 
broader literature that have proved to be the most controversial over time. These advantages – 
that it provides a nexus between relief and development; that it offers a level playing field for 
competition between the commercial and the farmer seed sectors; and that the proceeds from 
seed sales stay in the communities (Remington et al., 2002) – are discussed in detail in the 
sections below. We also highlight what appears to be a missed opportunity to use the fairs as a 
forum for the dissemination of agricultural extension messages, and we explore the potential for 
the ITF/voucher approach to provide a social protection mechanism to vulnerable farmers. 
Finally, we consider a range of options for the future development of ITFs and vouchers and 
summarize our recommendations. 
3.1 Relief or development? 
The seed fair and voucher approach was originally presented by CRS as an approach that 
allowed agencies to get off the ‘seeds-and-tools treadmill’, i.e. to move away from the repeated 
use of seeds and tools interventions, season after season (Remington et al. 2002). It is also said to 
lie at the ‘nexus between relief and development’ (Remington et al. 2002: 326) in that it is a 
flexible programming approach that can potentially be adapted to suit a range of different 
situations on the so-called relief-development continuum. To what extent have these advantages 
been realized in practice? 
The shift from seed kits to ITFs and vouchers has certainly allowed for a significant change in 
the way that emergency seed interventions are implemented in Mozambique. But after four years 
of ITFs in Mozambique, there appears to be a sense of frustration that ITF/voucher approach 
itself has become ‘normalized’ in that ITFs are being implemented on a bi-annual basis, even 
when some might consider that the so-called ‘emergency’ is not so severe that farmers couldn’t 
cope for themselves. Have ITFs and vouchers merely replaced the former seeds-and-tools 
treadmill? The apparent normalization of ITFs allows for more developmental objectives to be 
realized through innovations in the way in which ITFs and vouchers are programmed, but there 
appears to be a lack of consensus as to precisely what the objective of ITFs and vouchers ought 
to be. At the time the interviews for this study were being undertaken, the issue of ITFs and 
vouchers was a topic of considerable debate within DINA-MINAG. Some informants felt that 
ITFs and vouchers should promote enhanced market systems (based on periodic, ambulatory 
markets), particularly in the north of the country where local markets are not well-developed. 
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Others felt that they should be used to support the development of the seed sector, and especially 
the production of high quality seed by small scale seed producers. Both are possible, but 
achieving the chosen objective will require an appropriate and well-defined programming 
approach (see Table 12). 
Although exactly what the ultimate purpose of ITFs and vouchers should be remains uncertain at 
present, what is clear is that there is a desire to move away from emergency objectives towards 
more developmental objectives. This is symbolic of a widely shared sense of frustration within 
MINAG of the failure of repeated emergency interventions to alleviate the problems faced by 
poor farmers. Most of those working in the Ministry have developmental backgrounds and find it 
frustrating when their long-term programs are constantly derailed by short-term emergency 
interventions. There is a desire to achieve a greater level of sustainability in the interventions 
being promoted. In the case of ITFs and vouchers, one senior DINA official expressed the wish 
to see future fairs without any inputs from government or NGO intermediaries and in which 
vouchers will no longer be necessary. Such a move towards developmental objectives is certainly 
possible, but it will still be necessary to ensure that genuine emergency needs will be met in the 
event of a serious crisis. Here it is pertinent to remember that emergency needs are multiple, not 
just agricultural. 
Strong leadership will be required to overcome the current lack of consensus surrounding the 
way forward for ITFs and vouchers and to ensure that the approach evolves to meet a clearly 
articulated objective. Without this, there is the risk that ‘nexus’ position of ITFs and vouchers 
merely becomes a persistent confusion of purpose. 
3.2 Formal vs. informal seed sectors: Unfair competition at ITFs? 
According to the literature, seed fairs are said to offer a level playing field on which the 
commercial seed sector and the farmer seed sector can compete. However, it is also noted that 
the field can easily be tilted in favor of one or other of these players by influencing the way in 
which beneficiaries spend their vouchers (Remington et al. 2002). In Mozambique, there has 
been a lot of pressure from the seed companies and agents to tilt the field through various 
different mechanisms in favor of the formal seed sector. Such mechanisms include the 
prevention of publicly announcing seed prices prior to a fair, attempts to increase the price of 
seed being sold at the ITFs by local and non-local traders, attempts to restrict the participation of 
non-local traders at the ITFs, and – most recently – new requirements for the registration of 
vendors (see below and Annex 5). The need to ensure good seed quality provides the main 
justification for these actions, but various other issues relating to the formal and informal seed 
sectors are also involved, and these are explored below. 
First, it is necessary to summarize very briefly the perspectives of the different seed sector 
players: (Additional background information about the formal and informal seed sectors is 
provided in Annex 3.) 
(i) From the perspective of the formal seed companies, retailers, and the SNS: non-local 
traders are bringing grain from outside the local area and selling it at ITFs as seed. This 
‘grain-seed’ is not considered to be seed by the formal seed sector; it is sold at a low price 
(with which seed companies cannot compete) and is believed to be of inferior quality.  
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(ii) From the perspective of the traders and the Ministry’s local staff involved in organizing 
the fairs (the DDAs): the formal seed sector plays an important role in providing new 
‘improved’ varieties to farmers, but it is incapable of supplying either the types or the 
quantities of seed necessary for ITFs, and farmers often prefer to buy informal sector 
seed, particularly if they can buy it from local traders who they know and trust. 
(iii) Although we were unable to ask the perspectives of farmers specifically for this study, 
based on a detailed knowledge of both the formal and the informal seed sectors in 
Mozambique (see Annex 3), one might assume that farmers’ views would be somewhat 
more balanced: ITFs provide an opportunity to acquire formal sector seed of vegetable, 
beans and (for some farmers) hybrid maize relatively easily. An ITF might also provide 
an opportunity to acquire and test new varieties of seed, whether from formal or informal 
sectors. For poorer farmers, an ITF allows the opportunity to acquire informal sector seed 
that might otherwise be sought through kuthekela16 or (as a last resort) from the grain 
market. These poorer farmers would probably prefer to purchase cheaper informal sector 
seed at an ITF: they might plant some and then eat that which they don’t need for 
planting.
It is generally agreed that the problem between formal and informal seed sectors at ITFs is not 
the informal sector seed brought by local farmers and local traders, but the ‘grain-seed’ brought 
by non-local traders from distant grain markets. Unfortunately there is no seed quality data 
available to substantiate this17. Yet the situation has led to a very heated debate, described by one 
interviewee as a ‘war’ between SNS and the seed companies on the one hand against the non-
local traders on the other hand. While much of the debate has focused almost exclusively on seed 
quality (measured in terms of germination18), the issue of the appropriateness of the varieties 
provided has been entirely overlooked. The main reason that farmers prefer to purchase seed 
from local producers is because they know that the varieties are well-adapted to the local ecology 
and farmers’ preferences. Seed of unfamiliar varieties from outside the local area – whether these 
are from the formal or the informal seed sector – may not necessarily be adapted to local 
conditions, and it is only after farmers have tested them over two or three seasons that they will 
be able to determine their local appropriateness. Until the formal seed sector is better able to 
provide a range of varieties that are well-adapted to locally specific conditions, farmers are likely 
to be disappointed by formal sector seed, which tends to take a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to 
providing improved varieties to different ecologies. Similarly, non-local traders must recognize 
that, for example, seed of a local maize variety purchased in Manica District may not necessarily 
be suitable for cultivation in Massingir District. It is necessary that much grater attention is given 
to the local adaptability of seed provided through ITFs. 
16 Kuthekela is a local social protection mechanism that farmers draw on to acquire seed (and other forms of 
assistance) from other farmers (either within community or in distant communities) (Traedal 2002). Kuthekela
arrangements depend on the needs and capacities of the provider and the nature/closeness of the social relation 
between the provider and the receiver, as well as the type and quantity of seed being provided. Arrangements can 
vary from what might appear to be a free gift (though in reality it is not free but a social investment whereby the 
provider can seek assistance from the receiver in the future), or seed can be exchanged for work or other goods or 
services.
17 Very little SNS data is available and it does not distinguish seed of local traders/farmers from the seed of non-
local traders. 
18 Based on existing germination data for formal sector seed (Tables 7 and 8), SNS should perhaps focus its energies 
on ensuring that the quality of formal sector seed meets minimum germination levels.  
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Despite attempts to restrict the entry of non-local traders to some of the ITFs, it is generally 
agreed that all different types of vendors should be represented at the fairs. Some informants 
expressed concerns that without the informal traders and small-scale seed producers to provide 
competition at the fairs, seed companies and retailers would increase their prices to take 
advantage of the greater purchasing power promoted by the vouchers. However, the issue is not 
so much the types of vendors but the types of seed that are available at the fairs. Despite the 
efforts of the formal seed sector to promote good quality seed, the experiences that farmers may 
have had with formal sector seed in the past (e.g. through seed kits) and in the present (with 
some types of purchased seeds currently on the market) may have led them not to trust such seed, 
either because the variety itself is not locally adapted or because the germination rates have been 
far below expected standards. We recommend that much greater effort should be placed on 
ensuring the quality standards of formal sector seed. 
One suggestion for solving the problem of competition between formal and informal traders is to 
organize the ITFs in terms of seed vendor’s market share, for example by using different 
coloured vouchers: red vouchers for formal and white for informal seed vendors (Austral 
Consultoria e Projectos, Lda 2005). This, however, would restrict the degree of choice available 
to beneficiaries by obliging them to purchase both types of seed if they are to spend the vouchers 
of both colours. An alternative suggestion might be to encourage the different types of trader to 
sell different types of seed – in particular, for informal sector traders to sell formal sector seed. 
This already happens to some extent (see Table 6). Ultimately, however, a long-term solution 
may require some major changes in the way in which formal sector seed is currently produced 
and certified to allow for varying levels of certification standards (e.g. guaranteed seed) that is 
more affordable to small-scale farmers, as well as the development of varieties that are better 
adapted to low-resource conditions across a range of ecologies.
What has actually been put in place is a system that will require traders (both formal and 
informal) to register with the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Agriculture if they want 
to take part in the ITFs. Annex 5 provides a translation of the letter sent out by the Seed 
Department explaining the new procedures, which include the testing of seed prior to the ITFs. 
These procedures may limit the participation of informal sector traders, particularly the farmers 
and local traders who tend to supply very small quantities of high-quality, locally appropriate 
seed. Although DDA staff interviewed were confident that they would be able to assist such 
farmers and traders to become registered, these procedures are effectively forcing the 
‘formalization’ of the informal seed sector. If there are fewer local vendors at the fairs, it will 
also mean that less of the money generated by an ITF actually remains in the local communities. 
3.3 Market development 
The question as to whether the money from ITFs actually remains in the communities depends 
largely on whether or not the majority of the vendors come from the local area. It has been 
reported that 70% of vendors at CRS seed fairs held in Eastern Kenya are from the local 
communities, thus ensuring that a large proportion of the funds remain in the beneficiary 
communities (Makokha et al. 2004: 59). In Mozambique, however, only about 30% of the 
vendors come from the local communities (Table 5), implying that only a small proportion of the 
funds remain in the beneficiary communities. Yet, viewed from a broader market perspective, the 
ITF/voucher approach is a considerable improvement on the former seed kit approach, when all 
of the seed was purchased from neighboring countries. Under the present ITF/voucher system, 
34
much of the proceeds from the input sales remains in Mozambique.19 As such, ITFs and 
vouchers are benefiting markets in Mozambique. 
Although the majority of the proceeds from ITFs do not necessarily remain in the local 
communities, in general, it was widely felt that the fairs encouraged commercial activity and the 
potential for market development at a local level. The fairs themselves attract a number of traders 
selling an assortment of items such as sugar, rice, oil, soft drinks, etc. In some places, the fairs 
are also seen as an opportunity for farmers to sell not only agricultural inputs but also their 
outputs, particularly livestock (chickens, goats, etc). In some districts (eg Manhiça District, 
Maputo Province), beneficiaries are advised to bring their own money to the fair (in addition to 
the 20,000 Mts required for the voucher contribution), and non-beneficiaries are also invited to 
participate and bring their own money. Thus, the level of cash sales at a fair is often as great as 
the level of voucher sales (Table 3). In some districts, the experience of the fairs has prompted 
farmers and traders to request assistance from the DDA in organizing market days where they 
can sell their produce.
Such requests suggest that there is potential for market development in the areas where the fairs 
are held. In particular, the increased knowledge and the networking opportunities that are 
afforded by the fairs has in some cases allowed vendors to realize new opportunities. In some 
places, for example, links between seed companies and traders established through the fairs have 
allowed for traders to sell seed company products. One of the seed retailers interviewed reported 
that the experience of the fairs in Maputo Province allowed him to identify pockets of unmet 
demand and he subsequently opened two additional shops to meet this demand. In cases where 
the vendors have been able to increase their sales through participating in the fairs, some of the 
profits are invested into improving their business enterprise. The traders from Xai-Xai market 
who had participated in the ITFs, for example, reported that the fairs provided a good 
opportunity to sell their products and allowed them to sell considerably more in one day than 
they would normally. One female vendor said that she was typically able to sell 5 million Mts. in 
one day in Xai-Xai market, and 6 million in one day at a seed fair. Data recorded by CRS in 
Burundi for sales by traders in the 2003 B season show higher sales as a result of fairs: for the 
three main crops traded (beans, sorghum, groundnuts) an average of 35% of total sales were 
through CRS seed fairs20.
Despite the observation that the ITFs have the potential to promote market development, those 
interviewed also reported that the most successful fairs (in terms of levels of participation and 
overall turn-over) are those that take place in areas where markets are already well-developed. 
Fairs that are held near a main road, for example, tend to attract more traders (both official 
vendors and non-official traders who sell their products outside of the fair enclosure) and buyers 
(particularly non-beneficiaries who come with cash). Because transport is easier and there is a 
broader range of traders, a much greater diversity of inputs can be found at fairs held near a main 
road. In more remote locations where transport is problematic or more expensive, traders are 
unwilling to take the risk of transporting their goods to fairs in case they don’t sell their goods 
and then have to transport them back again. Thus, the location of a fair is an important factor. 
However, if the aim of ITFs is to promote market development, then it is necessary to hold fairs 
in the more remote locations where market development is needed. 
19 Although some of the inputs are imported (e.g. vegetable seed, actellic, and some of the tools), Mozambican 
companies and traders benefit from the sales. 
20 By crop, the proportion of sales through seed fairs was as follows: beans: 36% (out of a total of 503 MT); 
sorghum 7% (out of a total of 7.4 MT); and groundnuts 19% (out of a total of 3.724 MT) (Walsh et al 2004: 23).  
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3.4 Awareness-raising and the dissemination of agricultural technologies 
In general, agricultural fairs are seen to provide a good opportunity to promote awareness about 
key social issues. In Mozambique, theatre groups are regularly invited to the fairs to perform 
educational shows containing messages relating to HIV/AIDS. Similarly, in Western Uganda, 
fairs provide a captive audience for puppet shows that are used to sensitize communities about 
corruption, human rights and domestic violence (van der Steeg et al. 2004). Considering the 
agricultural focus of the fairs, however, it is surprising that no formal effort is currently made to 
promote agricultural extension messages at the fairs. At an informal level, much agricultural 
information is being exchanged: farmers learn about seed and inputs they previously may not 
have had access to; they discuss seed issues among themselves, with traders, and with company 
agents, and some might better realize the value of seed. Similarly, informal traders gain 
knowledge from farmers and from company agents about local preferences and the range of 
inputs available through the formal sector. Through direct contact with farmers and informal 
traders, company agents also learn about local preferences and markets. At an informal level, 
there is thus an abundance of information being shared among the fair participants. But not all of 
this information is necessarily accurate; in some cases it is mere propaganda on the part of the 
vendors wanting to promote and sell their products. Although DDA staff are aware that some of 
the propaganda information is inaccurate, at present there is no formal effort to provide accurate 
agricultural extension messages beyond the advice provided by individual DDA staff to 
individual farmers. As such ITFs are presently a missed opportunity for promoting accurate 
information about ‘improved’ agricultural technologies. We recommend that greater attention 
should be given to using ITFs as an opportunity to promote agricultural extension messages. 
3.5 Social protection 
Social protection mechanisms allow people to cope with adverse circumstances and enhance 
opportunities for poverty reduction, equity and growth. The primary purpose of social protection 
is threefold (Shepherd et al 2004): 
?? to prevent, mitigate and enhance the ability to cope with and recover from, the major hazards 
faced particularly by all poor people 
?? to contribute to chronically poor people’s ability to emerge from poverty, deprivation and 
insecurity and to challenge the oppressive socio-economic relationships which may keep 
them poor through increasing their livelihood security and linking such increases to 
promoting enhanced livelihoods 
?? to enable the less active poor to live a dignified life with an adequate standard of living, such 
that poverty is not passed from one generation to the next. 
There exists a vast array of different mechanisms through which social protection can be 
provided, including agricultural programs. In Mozambique, however, social protection is not yet 
on the agenda of MINAG, and agricultural staff are, in general, not familiar with the rationale or 
the approaches to social protection that are currently being promoted in other sectors or in other 
countries.
In Mozambique, there is increasing interest in social protection mechanisms to support those 
affected by HIV/AIDS and other vulnerable groups. At present, social protection is provided 
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through the National Institute for Social Action (INAS)21 within the Ministry of Women and 
Children. Another form of social protection is provided to those who have a Poverty Certificate 
(for which there is a complex registration and annual renewal process); these individuals receive 
a cash transfer of 80,000 Mts per month and are exempt from school fees, health fees, and other 
such payments. Thus, social protection systems already exist in Mozambique, and it would be 
possible to explore the potential for linking such systems to ITF/voucher interventions. 
Alternatively, ITFs and vouchers could perhaps be modified and developed as a social protection 
mechanism in itself, as outlined below. Lessons from the Starter Pack Programme in Malawi 
(Levy et al 2004) would provide a useful starting point in exploring the potential for 
transforming ITFs and vouchers into a social protection mechanism. Further data regarding the 
use of actual use of inputs provided through ITFs and their impacts on vulnerability and 
agricultural production would also be necessary. 
3.6 Options for the future development of ITFs and vouchers in 
Mozambique
The analysis of strengths, opportunities, weaknesses and threats (SWOT) of ITFs and vouchers 
undertaken as part of the broader evaluation of the drought response program offers a useful 
summary of some of the points presented in this report, and provides a good starting point in 
considering the potential for developing the ITF/voucher approach in various different ways. 
There are certainly various opportunities for building on the existing strengths and addressing the 
current weaknesses, but it is also necessary to look beyond the current ITF/voucher approach and 
consider the objective which it should be expected to fulfill. It is only once this objective is 
agreed, that it becomes possible to prioritize which strengths and weaknesses highlighted in 
Table 10 should be addressed. Various different potential objectives are outlined below.
Table 10. Strengths, opportunities, weaknesses and threats of ITFs and vouchers.
Strengths Weaknesses 
?? Seed fairs have had ample coverage in areas where they 
have been done 
??Quantity of seeds available at ITFs is usually sufficient to 
meet farmers requirements 
?? Seed multiplication plots are now being developed and 
managed by private individuals and associations 
?? Diverse seed varieties available in the fairs 
??Quality drought tolerant seeds of new varieties are being 
distributed
?? Beneficiaries are able to choose from the seeds available
?? Dissemination of information related to HIV/AIDS in some 
seed fairs 
?? Seed companies complain of unfair competition due to logistics 
considerations
?? Some low quality seeds appearing at the fairs 
?? End use of seeds not easily verifiable – some beneficiaries are 
eating their seeds 
?? High seed prices 
?? Delays in the execution of fairs and in seed distribution 
?? Undue focus on seeds at the cost of other farming inputs 
?? High cost to seed companies leads to attrition in company 
participation
?? Poor information regarding the needs and wants of local 
farmers weakens companies’ response to the needs of farmers 
?? Difficulty of testing and assuring seed quality at the time of the 
fairs
21 INAS works in the poorest parts of the country (Sofala, Inhambane, Zambézia and Tete) and targets those unable 
to work (mostly the elderly, but increasingly those with HIV/AIDS). Assistance is provided in the form of monthly 
food subsidies, construction materials, medicines and health education. They provide basic social services, construct 




?? Creation of rural based markets for local and improved seed 
varieties 
?? Untapped potential for increasing knowledge of improved 
cultivation techniques among rural population via small 
training sessions around the ITFs 
?? Distribution of a variety of farming inputs aside from seeds 
?? Increase information regarding rural populations needs to 
seed suppliers 
?? Lack of monitoring to verify end use of the seeds purchased 
?? High costs of formal sector seeds 
?? Seed companies reduce participation due to high costs 
?? Transportation costs to and from seed fairs in terms of time and 
money
?? The supply of poorly adapted varieties through ITFs are a 
disincentive to the adoption of improved varieties by farmers 
?? Lack of information regarding appropriate seeds for the area 
increases transaction costs of seed suppliers 
Source: Adapted slightly from Austral Lda (2004: 78)
In this section we highlight five different objectives that the ITF/voucher approach could 
potentially achieve. Each is briefly described, and a summary overview is provided by Table 11. 
(i) Emergency response to address lack of access to inputs 
This is the objective that Mozambique ITFs and vouchers were originally designed to meet, 
based on an approach that was adapted by ICRISAT from the CRS model. While there appears 
to be a move towards addressing alternative, more developmental objectives such as those 
below, it is also necessary to recognize and respond to a real emergency as and when this might 
occur. As an emergency response, ITF/voucher approaches should aim to allow beneficiaries to 
access a broad range of inputs that may not necessarily be only agricultural. Provided that 
markets are functioning, cash might be considered as an alternative to vouchers to allow for 
greater choice on the part of beneficiaries.
(ii) Social protection mechanism for vulnerable farmers 
Though the concept of social protection is not yet familiar to those working in the agricultural 
sector, there is a need to recognize that some farmers are chronically vulnerable and may require 
long-term assistance to enable them to emerge from chronic poverty and food insecurity. If ITFs 
and vouchers are to provide a social protection mechanism, then there is a need for careful 
targeting and plenty of choice in the types of inputs made available (i.e. not only agricultural).  
(iii) Promotion of rural trade and agricultural marketing 
Another option is for the current ITFs to evolve into ‘development fairs’ to promote rural trade in 
general and the marketing of agricultural products in particular. This implies that the fairs should 
not only provide an opportunity for farmers to purchase inputs, but also to sell their outputs, such 
as livestock and grain surpluses. This is already taking place to some extent, outside the 
perimeter of the fair itself, and the level of cash sales suggests that the scope exists for promoting 
rural markets. Under this objective, there should be as few restrictions as possible as to who can 
participate, either as vendors or buyers, but seed quality must be ensured.  
(iv) Promotion of the formal seed sector 
If the objective of the ITF/voucher approach is to promote the seed sector (whether formal or 
informal), it is essential that this is based on an accurate understanding of farmers’ seed 
preferences and requirements. The evidence available to date suggests that ITFs offer limited 
opportunities for substantial increases in the sale of formal sector seed.22 At the same time, the 
formal seed sector appears to be incapable of supplying enough beans and groundnuts to meet 
22 For example, just 5% of Panaar’s seed sales are channeled through the fairs, and although approximately 20% of 
seed agents’ sales are realized through fairs, the ITFs are considered by the agents to be very risky. 
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the demand from farmers, and the germination rates of formal sector seed is often well below 
acceptable standards. This would suggest that the performance of the formal seed sector itself 
should first be improved before being promoted. ITFs and vouchers might be expected to 
promote commercial seed sales only after the formal seed sector is able to provide seed of 
appropriate varieties (i.e. adapted to local ecologies and farmer preferences), at an acceptable 
quality, and at a price that is affordable to farmers. Meeting such conditions will require long-
term structural changes to the seed system. Current attempts to promote the development of the 
informal seed sector (through enhanced production practices and marketing), on the other hand, 
merely risks formalizing the informal sector and may prove to be counter-productive in the long 
term. 
(v) Promotion of crop and varietal diversity 
There is considerable experience with seed fairs that aim to promote crop and varietal diversity, 
particularly in Latin America. Within Africa, such fairs have been implemented successfully, 
though the approach that has been documented does not allow for farmers to access seed at the 
fairs, only to observe a range of varieties available from other farmers (Nathaniels and Mwijage 
2000). In this respect, the ITF/voucher approach offers the potential to adapt the approach of the 
varietal fairs that have been undertaken to date. Promoting agricultural diversity has the potential 
to strengthen local seed systems and increase resilience to drought and other disasters. 
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Table 11. Future options for vouchers and agricultural fairs according to various objectives 
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Although there is a widely shared view among those who we interviewed in the course of this 
study that ITFs and vouchers have a positive role to play in terms of rural development and 
meeting the needs of poor farmers, there is a need to make some high-level strategic decisions 
within DINA as to the specific objectives that vouchers and ITFs should aim to achieve. A 
number of options have been put forward, together with our own observations and suggestions as 
to the different ways in which the ITF/voucher approach could be implemented to meet each of 
these different objectives. The following recommendations have also been put forward by this 
report:
(i) Strong leadership will be required to overcome the current lack of consensus surrounding 
the way forward for ITFs and vouchers and to ensure that the approach evolves to meet a 
clearly articulated objective. This report puts forward a number of options regarding 
possible objectives. Any decisions regarding the future direction of ITFs and vouchers in 
Mozambique must necessarily be based on credible and well-documented evidence. 
(ii) Regardless of which option is chosen, there is a need to undertake more consistent 
monitoring, evaluation and analysis to ensure that lessons are learned and shared across 
different parts of the country and that the approach is achieving the desired impact.  
(iii) In addition to regular monitoring, we recommend that a study should be undertaken to 
understand how farmers actually make use of the inputs acquired from ITFs, and what 
impacts the ITF/voucher approach has on agricultural production, markets, food security 
and vulnerability. 
(iv) Greater attention could be given to integrating the ITF/voucher approach within existing 
needs assessment, early warning, and decision-making structures such as the ICRISAT 
seed needs assessment methodology, DAP, GAPSAN and SETSAN. In the case of the 
ICRISAT methodology, some clarification may be necessary regarding the practical use 
of the local agricultural system profiles for needs assessment. 
(v) In organizing the ITFs, we recommend that as much information as possible is given to 
farmers concerning the inputs available, the prices, and how to use them (for those inputs 
which are unfamiliar). This will ensure greater transparency and choice to farmers.  
(vi) ITFs should be seen as an opportunity for promoting accurate information about 
‘improved’ agricultural technologies. We recommend that greater attention should be 
given to using ITFs to promote agricultural extension messages. 
(vii) In addition to seed quality, it is necessary that much greater attention is given to the local 
adaptability of seed provided through ITFs. 
(viii) In terms of seed quality testing, we recommend that – as well as distinguishing formal 
and informal sector seed - testing should distinguish informal sector seed which comes 
from grain markets from that which comes from local farmers’ fields, and that test results 
should be made available to those concerned.  
(ix) More generally, we recommend that much greater effort should be placed on ensuring the 
quality standards of formal sector seed – for seed which is provided through ITFs and 
other formal sector seed channels. 
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Annex 1. List of People Interviewed 
Sergio Gouveia, DINA 
Joaquim Cuna, UCEA 
Paciencia Banze, SNS 
Domenico Liuzzi, Kulima 
Eduardo Costa, Action Aid (Maputo) 
Francisco Chilenge, Panaar Seed Company 
Nicolao Dunhe, Hortimoc (SEMOC retailer, Maputo) 
Emigdio Oliveira, DFID 
Sam Bickersteth, DFID 
Laurence Hendrickx, FAO 
Michelle Mac Nabb, FEWSNET 
José da Graça, SPA-Maputo 
Teresa Helena Boaventura, SPA-Matola –Maputo province 
Pinto Luciano (Seed Focal Point), SPA-Maputo Province 
Diogo Cavele, SPA–Marracuene (Maputo Province)
Virgina Cumba, SPA–Marracuene (Maputo Province)  
Custodio João, SPA–Marracuene (Maputo Province) 
Ancha, Xai-Xai Market trader 
Pedro Dzucule, SPA-Inhambane 
Arlindo Maluzane, SPA-Inhambane 
Antonio Quimbine, SPA-Inhambane 
Fernando Chilengue, Adviser to SPA-Inhambane 
Rafael Baule, DDA-Inharrime (Inhambane Province) 
Rogue Antonio, DDA-Zavala (Inhambane Province) 
Louis Alicate, DDA-Zavala (Inhambane Province) 
Bedes Armando Simango, DDA-Zavala (Inhambane Province) 
Pablo Manembué, SPA-Xai-Xai (Gaza Province) 
Theresa, Xai-Xai Market trader 
Lydia, Xai-Xai Market trader 
Aderito Mavie, DDA-Chokwe (Gaza Province) 
Stefano Ubisse, DDA-Chokwe (Gaza Province)
Felisberto Chambal, SEMOC Retailer, Chokwe 
Eduardo Langane, SNS laboratory, Chokwe 
Gilda Francisco Rizar, SNS laboratory, Chokwe 
Teresa Machai, Action Aid (3 de Fevereiro; Manhiça) 
Gabriel Chambo, SPA-Manhiça (Maputo Province) 
Lori Bell, FAO-SETSAN
Helder Gemo. Director of DNER (Direção Nacional de Extensao Rural) (telephone interview) 
Britt Granqvist, former SEMOC Marketing Manager, (email correspondence)
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Annex 2. The Technical Secretariat for Food Security and
Nutrition (SETSAN) 
Presidência do SETSAN
Ministro da Tutela dos Ministérios Chaves (Rotativo anualmente)
Secretariado Executivo
Secretário Executivo, Assessor, Coordenador 
e os Chefes das Unidades Permanentes
Unidade Permanente
Coordenação Sistemas de 
Informação
Unidade Permanente
Análise, Políticas, Plano e 
Monitoria
Coordenador
























Definição de Estratégias na 
Implementação de Políticas 




Formulação d e 
Políticas
Definição de Estratégias na 
Implementação de Políticas 
Assessor Rotativo 
anualmente
Source: SETSAN 2004 
SETSAN aims to create the decentralized institutional structures necessary for the timely 
diagnosis and subsequent decision-making to alleviate food and nutritional insecurity. In the past 
four or five years the organization of SETSAN has been subject to considerable change, and has 
ultimately emerged as a strong, well-coordinated structure that brings together a wide range of 
governmental, non-governmental and international organizations working to promote food 
security in Mozambique. As illustrated by the organogram, SETSAN is composed of two core 
units: information systems and policy analysis. Within the information unit, there are a number 
of technical working groups. Though the efforts of SETSAN’s policy unit are less well-
developed than those of the information unit, improvements are expected in the future.  
The Technical Working Groups of SETSAN have also changed in the past year. Formerly, those 
relating to agriculture included the Agricultural Early Warning Group (GAPA), and the 
Evaluation Group for Agricultural Emergencies. The Early Warning Working Group for Food 
Security and Nutrition (GAPSAN) was formed at the end of 2004/beginning of 2005. Currently, 
the two phases of early warning coordinated by SETSAN include work by GAPSAN that 
monitors the progress of the rainy season and crop production and highlights any potential risks 
or threats in different parts of the country. The Vulnerability Assessment Committee (GAV) then 
follows up on the information provided by GAPSAN to identify particular areas of vulnerability. 
There is considerable overlap in the composition of the working groups, allowing for continuity 
in the specific tasks undertaken by each.
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Annex 3. Seed Systems in Mozambique 
The informal seed sector23
Most of the seed presently used by Mozambican farmers today is sourced through informal 
channels, often referred to as the local seed system. This system encompasses all activities from 
production through to utilization including seed exchange that is not controlled by formal 
institutions either public or private. Its main characteristic is that production; selection and 
storage are carried out by local farmers primarily for their own use but also for exchange 
amongst neighbors through well-defined local dynamics. Another important characteristic is that 
with few exceptions, seed production is an integral part of crop production whether for food or 
other uses. This is one of the reasons for the higher adaptability of local varieties to specific 
growing conditions compared to introduced varieties and the resilience of the system. 
As women have the primary responsibility for ensuring the household’s food security, it is 
natural that they should have the main responsibility for selecting and saving seeds from the crop 
harvest. Men provide containers or construct storage facilities for both grain and seed, and are 
known to sometimes bring seed of new varieties from elsewhere for testing in the farms. 
Very low levels of improved inputs are used for crop production in Mozambique. Seeds are the 
most important input – and often the only input used. Women and men farmers are conscious 
that seed is an essential input for food security and use a wide range of local varieties or 
landraces that have specific names in each region. The extent of genetic diversity between these 
local landraces in different regions is not fully understood. According to Ferguson, varieties with 
the same name have often widely different morphological and genetic characteristics and little 
homogeneity, suggesting that they might actually be different (ICRISAT 2002a). 
Women and men farmers commonly exchange seed with their neighbors or with farmers from 
nearby villages. Seed may be provided as a gift, as a loan to be repaid at harvest, or exchanged 
for labor or other products. In many villages, some women and men farmers are recognized as 
“seed providers”. Seed donations are more common among relatives but seed exchange is always 
practiced if seed is available. 
The grain market is an important source of seed. Women and men farmers buy grain for use as 
seed, but are careful in selecting the right variety. Even though traders bring grain from distant 
areas, farmers are aware that not all varieties are suitable to the local conditions and recognize 
the adapted ones. 
Small-scale farmers rarely use commercial seed, except for vegetable crops. There are several 
reasons for this, mainly the limited number of retail outlets in villages and the high cost of seed 
compared to grain. Instead, farmers use a combination of seed sources to obtain planting seed. 
Under normal conditions, the main source is their own seed (72%) supplemented with grain 
purchased from the markets and/or gifts or loans from relatives and friends (16%). Few farmers 
(12%) rely solely on purchasing seed. Surprisingly, it is the poorest farmers who most rely on 
purchased seed – possibly a day-to-day survival strategy for families with very low incomes. 
23 Taken from: Dominguez and Jones 2003 
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Table 12. Distinctions between informal and formal seed sectors 
Informal seed sector Formal seed sector 
?? Seed production integral to crop production 
?? Farmer seed selection 
?? Regulation through “good neighborliness” 
?? Quality of seed/variety is maintained through good 
management
?? Range of seed acquisition methods 
?? New varieties through social networks, local 
selection, and formal seed system 
?? Very resilient and continues to function in disasters
?? Seed multiplication separate from crop production 
?? Quality control regulated externally (seed legislation) 
?? Recommended that seed is replaced every 3 years 
?? Seed acquired for cash through commercial 
channels
?? Dependent on existence of a commercial agricultural 
system
?? New varieties through research and development 
?? Vulnerable to collapse without sufficient funding 
The formal seed sector 
The formal seed sector includes the public and private institutions involved in the research, 
production, multiplication and dissemination of seed. Table 11 summarizes the main differences 
between with informal and formal seed sectors. In Mozambique, the national seed program was 
initiated in 1978 and this led to the establishment of the commercial (state-owned) seed 
company, SEMOC (Sementes de Mocambique) in 1990. This was the only seed company until 
1999 and produced seed on its own farms and by contract. Up to 1986, SEMOC produced 
various seed types (maize, rice groundnut, bean, cowpea, soybean, sorghum vegetables) for state 
owned farms while subsistence farmers generally used their use their own seed (from the 
informal sector) or seed re-circulated by the marketing parastatal enterprise AGRICOM. From 
1987 to1995 the seed market was dominated by relief supply, whereby donor funds were used to 
purchase seed from SEMOC that was then distributed among farmers affected by conflict and/or 
drought. In the late 1990s, efforts were made to promote local seed production and expand the 
national seed industry to increase the availability of quality seed and improved varieties. 
The National Seed Service (SNS) is responsible for increasing national seed productivity through 
the promotion and protection of seed quality and the supervision of control of quality (both 
domestic and imported). This includes all activities relating to inspections of fields or seed 
production and laboratory analysis to certify seed quality. Seed legislation includes sanctions on 
those who are found to be selling low quality seed. However, in practice there have been no 
known cases in which seed sellers have actually been penalized for selling poor quality seed. 
This is not because they are not selling poor quality seed, but because SNS has not yet applied 
the legal sanctions that exist. 
The private seed sector is composed of two main seed companies, SEMOC and Pannar, and also 
a number of seed retailers. Most of the seed retailers used to be shopkeepers employed in 
SEMOC shops that used to exist throughout the country. Initially they were compelled to source 
seed from SEMOC, but recently it has become possible for them to source seed from any seed 
company. Each seed company (SEMOC, Pannar) is associated with about 25-50 small retailers, 
some of which are now registered seed trading companies24. Both the seed companies and the 
trading companies are registered by SNS and are subject to the legislation regarding quality 
control.
24 Seed trading companies include: SEMOC, TECAP, PANNAR, HORTIMOC, Munguambe & Filhos, Matuel 
Comercial, Bila Emprendimentos, Maurício Dengo Comercial, Alberto Chambal, Bonifácio Marihemo, Hygrotech, 
Qualita, and IAP. 
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Annex 4. Monitoring Data Collected by Vendors’ Record Form 
Number 
Location of fair 
Date of fair 
Type of vendor: Local or Company 
Name of vendor or company 
Gender: Male or Female 
Crop or tool Varieties or 
types
Quantity of 
inputs brought to 
fair (kg or unit) 
Quantity of 
inputs sold at fair 
(kg or units) 
Price at fair 
(Mt/kg or Mt/unit) 
Total value of 
sales (Mt) 
TOTAL      
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Annex 5. Recent Regulations Concerning Registration of 
Vendors at Fairs 
Translation of the letter from the Seed Department to SPAs, SEMOC and PANNAR 
Subject: Seed Fair Interventions 
Date: 25 April 2005
In recent years we have verified that there is an abnormal movement of informal traders within 
seed fairs, selling grain as if it were seed, side by side with seed companies.  
This situation is a big concern, because it compromises the objective of the seed fairs, and it is 
impossible to apply any mechanisms of control to this type of activity and it goes against some 
of the norms established in place for in the seed sector.  
The way to improve this situation for the future and the quality of the service give for these 
interventions to the productive sector, we recommend as follows: 
a) Any vendor that wants to sell seed must be registered as a seed producer-distributor.  
b) This registration is done in the Ministry of Commerce. According with the ‘certification 
of the negative’ coming from the commercial registry office to have the ‘alvara’ (tax 
reference) according to the type of business they operate (seed or any other input).
c) Having this ‘alvara’, they have to go to the Ministry of Agriculture and register as a seed 
vendor.
d) For the vendors wanting to participate as producers (either on their own or by sub-
contract) or distributors, it will be necessary for them to have facility es to clean, treat, 
weigh and pack the seeds and weight the seed and pack.
e) Seed should be of known origin, form local producers or private sector that have 
assistance from seed technicians through the DDAs. Commercialization should be 
oriented to producers that have been previously identified through the DDA, and assisted 
during the production season, same as they have the preference to acquire the product in 
one specific zone.
f) Local producers that are an integral part of the local seed production system. The 
entrance in the seed fair should be credited by the DDA and registered in the database of 
the seed department to be able to be controlled during the seed fairs.  
g) All participants should be selected in advance through the testing of the seed that will be 
sold in the fair. 
h) The quality control for the producer is extensively to the formal seed companies that 
acquire ‘seed’ coming from the small producers and specifically for crops such as gnut 
and beans. 
Kindest regards 
Head of the Seed Department 
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